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Abstract
Financing and Corporate Growth under Repeated Moral Hazard
This paper considers the impact of ¯nancial contracting on growth by exploring
a model where entrepreneurs initially do R&D but subsequently need both outside
investors to provide funds for capital investments and outside managers to operate
the ¯rm e±ciently some time after assets are in place. The source of contracting
ine±ciency is that insiders can divert cash °ows for their own bene¯t. We employ a
repeated game framework which allows us to model outside equity as well as inside
equity and debt. We call our framework the two-stage model of ¯rm growth. A key
¯nding is that outside equity promotes ex post e±ciency (second stage growth) at
the expense of ex ante e±ciency (¯rst stage growth), while debt works the opposite
way. This is because equity promotes replacement of the entrepreneur, while debt
promotes entrenchment. So debt has the disadvantage that it is less conducive to the
implementation of second stage growth than equity, but the advantage that it provides
the entrepreneur with more incentives to do R&D in the ¯rst place. Furthermore,
equity is fragile, in the sense that moral hazard may be so high that investors will not
¯nance the ¯rm, regardless of the discount rate. In contrast, debt ¯nancing de¯nitely
can be raised for low discount rates. A prediction of the model is that in a cross-section
of ¯rms, we should observe a preponderance of highly levered, closely-held ¯rms which
have stagnated after an early growth phase.
Keywords: corporate growth, incomplete ¯nancial contracting, outside equity, debt,
repeated moral hazard
JEL Classi¯cation Numbers: G30, O33, L14
... When, Caius, Rome is thine,
Thou art poor'st of all; then shortly art thou mine.
Coriolanus
1 Introduction
This paper considers the impact of ¯nance on growth by exploring a model where
entrepreneurs need both outside investors to provide funds and outside managers to
operate the ¯rm e±ciently once assets are in place. In particular, we examine the
implications of ¯nancial contracts for the growth of the ¯rm both at initial stages when
the product idea is developed and at later stages when the ¯rm can take its operations
to a higher, more pro¯table level. The possible ¯nancial contracts we consider are
inside equity, outside equity, and debt. The source of contracting ine±ciency is that
insiders can divert cash °ows for their own bene¯t. In addition, our framework is
designed to capture the simple fact that the insider who can contribute most to the
¯rm at one stage of its development may well become a source of under-performance
later. We model these features by considering the problem of an entrepreneur who
in an initial stage chooses whether to undertake R&D. Given a successful outcome of
R&D, the entrepreneur attempts to implement the product idea by obtaining external
¯nancing, needed to make capital investments, and then by initially managing the ¯rm.
At some stage, however, the ¯rm can be made more pro¯table by the appointment of
a more able, outside manager. We call this framework the two-stage model of ¯rm
growth.
In this context, there are several distinct obstacles to achieving e±ciency. First,
positive NPV R&D projects which could obtain external ¯nancing may not be un-
dertaken because the entrepreneur's returns are too low. Second, post R&D, positive
NPV capital investments may not be done because su±cient external ¯nancing cannot
be raised. Third, post capital investment, the ¯rm's assets may be operated ine±-
ciently. The combination of these three elements is at the heart of the interaction
between ¯nancial contracting and the creation of growth opportunities. Showing how
this interaction under outside equity ¯nancing is fundamentally di®erent than under
debt ¯nancing is the principal contribution of our paper. A key ¯nding is that equity
promotes ex post e±ciency (second stage growth) at the expense of ex ante e±ciency
(¯rst stage growth), while debt works the opposite way.
Under outside equity ¯nancing our main results turn on the di®erent degrees of
managerial moral hazard that can occur in equilibrium at the production stage. There
are two main cases. In the ¯rst, the ¯rm ends up being operated by the entrepreneur
(entrepreneurial equilibrium) in which case second stage growth potential is not real-
ized. In contrast, if second stage growth is implemented, the ¯rm will be operated by
an outside manager (managerial equilibrium). These production stage outcomes feed
back to initial investment decisions. A necessary condition for R&D is that, given a
successful outcome, an IPO can be done. However, even if an IPO would be successful,
underinvestment in R&D can arise for any of three reasons:
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² When managerial moral hazard of outsiders is high, entrepreneurial equilibria
tend to occur, but the cash °ow generated by the entrepreneur may be too low
to cover the costs of R&D;
² When managerial moral hazard of outsiders is low, managerial equilibria tend to
occur, but the perk consumption by the outside manager acts as a dead-weight
cost so that returns to the entrepreneur may be insu±cient to cover R&D costs;
² When outside managerial moral hazard is intermediate, managerial equilibria
may occur even though ex ante the entrepreneur prefers an entrepreneurial equi-
librium which would provide returns su±cient to cover the costs of R&D. This
points out an important time inconsistency problem with outside equity ¯nancing.
Finally, we show that moral hazard may be so high that investors will not ¯nance the
¯rm regardless of the discount rate. This illustrates the fragility of outside equity.
The main contrasts between debt and equity in our framework arises from di®er-
ences in control rights; whereas equity provides investors with unconditional control
rights, debt bestows control rights to creditors only in case of default. We show that
debt facilitates the entrenchment of the entrepreneur when that it is optimal from his
perspective ex ante. As a result, debt eliminates the time inconsistency problem with
outside equity and therefore enhances the entrepreneur's incentive to do R&D. The
contingent control rights of debt also eliminates the fragility problem of outside equity.
The main downside with debt is that the entrenched entrepreneur will not realise
the second stage growth potential of the ¯rm. Furthermore, under managerial equi-
libria there is a double moral hazard problem. Speci¯cally, both the manager and
the entrepreneur are involved in the decision to service the debt. Each in his turn is
tempted by the alternative of taking the available cash °ows. The upshot is that for
su±ciently high discount rates some projects that could be ¯nanced with equity cannot
be ¯nanced using debt.
Our model is consistent with the empirical observation that debt ¯nance dominates
among smaller ¯rms.1 As we have emphasized, debt is well-suited to giving incentives
for the creation of early growth opportunities, but may be an obstacle to later growth.
Therefore, in a cross-section we would expect to see a preponderance of smaller, rel-
atively highly levered ¯rms which have stagnated after an initial growth spurt.2 Our
model is also consistent with the idea that equity will be chosen by technological ¯rms
with large amounts of intangible assets. Our interpretation of this is that initial in-
siders of such ¯rms have inalienable human capital which depreciates relatively slowly.
Therefore, they may enjoy a relatively long period during which they will be retained
by outside shareholders. As a result, equity ¯nance will give them adequate incentives
to develop the product idea in the ¯rst place.
Our basic line of argument can be stated as follows. The model starts with a
potential entrepreneur who must decide whether or not to undertake R&D, which will
result in an idea for a product. Bringing this idea to fruition requires making some
capital investment which, since the entrepreneur is cash constrained, must be ¯nanced
1Finance for Small Firms { An Eighth Report, Bank of England, March 2001.
2See the empirical study of Lang, Ofek, and Stulz [1996] who ¯nd a negative correlation between
leverage and ¯rm growth.
2
by raising external ¯nancing. Once ¯nancing has been raised and the investment has
been made, the project will return a stream of cash °ows forever unless it is liquidated.
At the outset the ¯rm must be managed by the entrepreneur who produces a cash
°ow, ¼1, each period. After a time, however, it will be apparent how the machines
are operated, so that outside shareholders can replace the entrepreneur with a new
manager who produces a cash °ow ¼2 which may be greater than ¼1, re°ecting the
fact that managing the ¯rm may require a di®erent mix of talents than developing the
initial product idea. The insider who controls the ¯rm has the opportunity to divert
part of the cash °ows for personal consumption. If the majority of shareholders are
unhappy with the level of reported cash °ows, they may ¯re old management and hire
new ones to run the assets in place. Alternatively, shareholders can liquidate the ¯rm
and obtain its scrap value.
Under equity ¯nance, once the ¯rm is being operated under an outside manager, it
will continue as long as the manager pays su±ciently large dividends. We show that
depending upon the discount rate, r, there may be a range of possible dividend pay out
rates, y2, which will sustain the ¯rm as a going concern. However, managers will never
pay out everything (y2 < 1) so that there is always some degree of managerial moral
hazard. Consequently, there is some maximum discount rate beyond which positive
NPV capital investments will not be undertaken.
Earlier, when the entrepreneur is still in charge but has become replaceable, the
entrepreneur can attempt to save his job by paying a dividend which matches the
dividend expected under an outside manager. He will choose to match dividends if
and only if the outside managers' payout rate, y2, is less than a critical value which
is strictly less than the upper bound, ¼1=¼2, for which it is feasible to do so. When
outside managers pay out more than this critical value, the entrepreneur will cede
managerial control. In this case, given that his days are numbered, the entrepreneur
will consume maximum perquisites during the period that he is in control of the ¯rm.
Thus even though the second stage growth of the ¯rm is socially e±cient (since ¼1 < ¼2)
the diversion of cash °ow (¼1) to the entrepreneur when he is in charge aggravates
the underinvestment problems caused by the partial loss of cash°ows to the outside
manager. As with other dynamic agency models, ex post e±ciency may con°ict directly
with ex ante e±ciency. Speci¯cally, for some cases R&D will be undertaken if and only
if subsequently the ¯rm will be operated by the entrepreneur and therefore fail to
realise its second stage growth potential.
In our framework debt acts quite di®erently than does equity. In particular, since
creditors' control rights are conditional on default, there is no pressure for the en-
trepreneur to match the dividends of more able outside managers. All the entrepreneur
needs to do to retain control is to service debt. As a result, debt can favor entrench-
ment by the entrepreneur and, consequently, can serve as a more potent incentive for
doing the R&D needed for the ¯rm to grow at the outset.
We focus on debt and equity because the ine±ciencies that we have uncovered
in our dynamic agency model of two-stage growth have not been identi¯ed previously.
Furthermore, we think that these are of major importance in understanding the ¯nanc-
ing patterns and determinants of growth in many environments, particularly relatively
unsophisticated ones. The insights of our analysis can be used to study more com-
plicated and possibly superior contracts and may underly the motives for many real
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world ¯nancial innovations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the
relationship of our analysis with the literature. In Section 3, we present the model
in the case of equity ¯nance. In Sections 4 and 5, we analyze equity ¯nancing. In
Section 6, we introduce debt ¯nancing and compare this with equity ¯nancing. In
Section 7, we explore the two-stage ¯rm growth framework under other contractual
forms. We also consider how the model can be extended to take into account uncertain
cash °ows and unanticipated technological shocks. Section 8 is devoted to conclusions.
An appendix contains proofs not supplied in the text.
2 Relation to Literature
Our paper is related most directly to Myers [2000], who argues that to understand
the fundamental di®erences between debt and equity in the absence of institutional
arrangements that facilitate distribution of cash °ows it is necessary to revert to the
paradigm of non-contractible cash °ows. Furthermore, in this setting, outside equity
only makes sense in a dynamic context which creates a tradeo® for managers between
short term gains from retaining current cash °ows for themselves, on the one hand,
and long term bene¯ts from continued employment, on the other. This tension is
present in the two main cases he explores (the \partnership model" and the \corporate
model") and is the springboard for a variety of the suggestive observations he makes.
We pursue this line of research by introducing the model of two-stage growth and by
explicitly characterizing the implications of ¯nancial contracting for growth at both
stages. Once second stage growth has been achieved our model operates very much
like Myers' so that the intertemporal tradeo® faced by managers is at the heart of our
analysis just as well. However, what is completely new here is the explicit study of the
implications of the insider becoming an obstacle to growth once what was his speci¯c
expertise becomes available more generally.3
Our result that debt facilitates precommitment by the entrepreneur to pay out cash
is related to the literature on the disciplinary role of debt. The traditional argument,
advanced in an in°uential contribution by Jensen [1986], is essentially that when in-
vestors are uncoordinated, the hardness of debt is a useful disciplinary device since the
failure to service debt automatically leads to bankruptcy, which is costly for managers
because they may lose their jobs and possibly reputation. In contrast, the softness of
equity allows managers great freedom in diverting free cash °ows to uses that bene-
¯t them at the expense of investors. Our line of argument is quite di®erent. In our
model, equityholders are su±ciently coordinated to ¯re the incumbent and there are
alternative outside managers. This puts pressure on the entrepreneur to perform since
equityholders have unconditional control rights and can therefore ¯re the incumbent
at any time if they think an outside manager will pay larger dividends. The problem is
that if this pressure is too great, the entrepreneur will simply divert everything he can
3Our paper is also related to that of Fluck [1998] who analyses a repeated moral hazard model
similar to Myers. She shows that when cash °ows are non-contractible, outside equity is only feasible
as an in¯nite (or uncertain) horizon claim. Consequently, we adopt the framework of an in¯nitely
repeated game.
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to himself while he is in charge of the company, knowing full well that this will lead to
equityholders ¯ring him. In contrast, under debt ¯nancing, there is no similar outside
pressure since investors now do not have the right to replace the entrepreneur, unless
he defaults. Thus, counterintuitively, in our model debt ¯nancing encourages pay outs
by the entrepreneur because debt limits the disciplinary toolbox available to investors.
The underlying premise of Jensen's argument is that it is di±cult to make ¯nancial
contracts contingent on cash °ows. This idea was earlier formalized by Townsend [1978]
and Gale and Hellwig [1985] who arrive at the conclusion that debt will arise naturally
in a setting where cash °ows are costly to verify (see also Grossman and Hart [1982]).
More recently, Hart and Moore [1998] and Bolton and Scharfstein [1990, 1996] use
an incomplete contracts framework to study characteristics of optimal debt structures
when cash °ows are not veri¯able at any cost. In a model where cash °ows are veri¯-
able but managerial e®ort is not, Aghion and Bolton [1992] show that debt can play a
role in precommiting investors to punish low managerial e®ort (see also Berkovitch and
Israel [1996] and Berkovitch, Israel and Spiegel [2000]). Dewatripont and Tirole [1994]
have utilized this idea in a model with multiple investors where optimal capital struc-
ture involves a mixture of debt and equity. Outsiders are willing to hold equity in these
models since cash °ows are assumed to be contractible.
Our result that debt can be used to entrench the entrepreneur bears resemblance
in appearance to results found by Stulz [1988] and Harris and Raviv [1988], but in
these papers the channel through which entrenchment is facilitated is through a re-
duction in outsiders' voting shares arising from an increase in leverage. In our paper,
entrenchment arises as a consequence of the precommitment function of debt. Shleifer
and Vishny [1989] have suggested that entrenchment can also result from incumbents
overinvesting in projects that are speci¯c to the expertise of the incumbents. A paper
more related to ours is Zwiebel [1996] who presents a ¯nite-horizon model where com-
mitment e®ects and entrenchment e®ects are both present. In particular, he considers
a model where a manager chooses to take on debt in order to curb his natural predilec-
tion for empire building and, in this way, succeeds in entrenching himself. Zwiebel
does not consider the original ¯nancing of the ¯rm and therefore is not concerned with
the existence of outside equity as such. Furthermore, the crucial ingredient that allows
debt to serve as a commitment for Zwiebel is that managers pay out all available cash
as dividends. This makes sense in his context because he assumes managers are only
motivated by the private bene¯ts of control and derive zero bene¯t from sharing in the
¯rm's cash °ows. As a consequence, his framework is quite distant from ours.
The theme of growth and ¯nance is taken up in two other literatures, but in ways
that are only distantly related to our paper. The literature on venture capital explores
the consequences of ¯nance arrangements between the venture capitalist and the en-
trepreneur. See Kaplan and StrÄomberg [2000] for references. This paper also docu-
ments the importance of control rights in ¯nancial contracting in practice. Our model
cannot be considered a proper model of venture capital because we treat this whole
process as a black-box whereby a single agent (the entrepreneur) chooses whether or
not to undertake costly R&D which, if undertaken, will be successful for sure. What
we explore, and what the venture capital literature does not, is the consequence of
subsequent ¯nancing choices (the IPO phase) for the total value of a successful R&D
outcome.
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Finally, in the macroeconomics literature ¯nance and growth is explored in a num-
ber of international comparisons which have documented a positive correlation between
measures of ¯nancial development and growth (see, e.g., Goldsmith [1969]). Recently,
Rajan and Zingales [1998] ¯nd evidence supporting the hypothesis that ¯nancial devel-
opment stimulates growth. At the theoretical level, Greenwood and Jovanovic [1990]
make the case for two-way causality. That is, ¯nancial development fosters growth by
increasing the return on capital, and growth in turn provides the funds to invest in
¯nancial institutions. This literature does not explicitly address the source of imper-
fection in the ¯nancial sector. Our paper may be seen as providing a micro foundation
for the interaction between ¯nance and growth by providing a dynamic agency model
in which di®erent ¯nancial structures have an explicit impact on the pace of techno-
logical change both through the rate of creation of growth opportunities and in the
pace of the adoption of new techniques. The model studied here might be a useful
building block in the construction of an integrated theory of how ¯nancial structure
evolves over time and interacts with the emergence of growth opportunities.
3 Description of the Model under Equity Financing
We use the following notation.
² K, the entrepreneur's cost of developing a product idea;
² I, the cost of investment to implement the product idea;
² °, the fraction of common stock retained by the entrepreneur after the sale of
shares to outsiders;
² ¼1, the cash °ow per period if the entrepreneur runs the ¯rm (non-contractible);
² ¼2, the cash °ow per period if an outside manager runs the ¯rm (non-contractible);
² yit, the payout ratio at date t ; i.e., the fraction of cash °ow that a manager
of type i reports to investors (i = 1 for \entrepreneur" and i = 2 for \outside
manager");
² L, the liquidation value of the ¯rm. We assume that L · I. Hence, investing in
the project only to collect the liquidation value at date 1 yields a negative NPV;
² r, the discount rate per period.
The model has three sets of players; the entrepreneur, outside managers, and
investors. All parameter values are common knowledge, but cash °ows are non-
contractible. The strategic focus of the model is on the entrepreneur's and outside
managers' choices of payout rates and how investors react to them. The timing of
events and players' decision sets are as follows:
Time t = 0. The entrepreneur decides whether or not to do R&D. If he does so,
he pays K and receives the product idea.
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Time t = 0+. Given the product idea, the entrepreneur attempts to realise it
through a capital investment costing I. To ¯nance this he sells (1¡°) of the shares to
outside investors which leaves him holding °. Control is given to outside investors (the
shares received by the entrepreneur can be viewed as non-voting shares with the same
dividend rights as investors' shares). The ¯rm begins operations under the entrepreneur
who generates a cash °ow ¼1. The entrepreneur must then decide the initial payout
ratio, y10 2 [0; 1]. He pays out y10¼1 to shareholders and consumes the rest.
Time t ¸ 1. Once the ¯rm is up and running, the Time 1 stage game, described
here, is repeated until the ¯rm is liquidated (which may be never). Investors have the
¯rst move, which is to choose
st 2 fretain; replace; liquidateg:
That is, investors decide whether to retain the incumbent manager, replace the in-
cumbent manager and continue with a new manager, or liquidate the ¯rm. In case of
liquidation, the game ends, shareholders receive the liquidation value L, and managers
receive nothing unless they also are shareholders. If instead the ¯rm is kept alive, the
cash °ow ¼1 is produced if the entrepreneur has been retained as manager. If another
manager has been appointed, the cash °ow is ¼2 ¸ ¼1. The manager who is in charge,
decides the payout ratio, yit 2 [0; 1]. Shareholders receive a total dividend of yit¼i and
the current manager receives (1¡ yit)¼i (plus dividends if he is also a shareholder).
For simplicity, we assume that managers (including the entrepreneur) do not draw
any salary. This would emerge for example if the reservation wage of managers is 0
and competition among them forces their contractual wage to this level. Their com-
pensation is therefore completely determined by the portion of the cash °ows they
do not report to investors (i.e. their perk consumption). Managers are assumed to
having no money initially so that shareholders cannot require newly engaged managers
to pay for the right to extract perks in the future. We also assume that the managerial
labor pool is in¯nitely deep. Hence, once a manager has been ¯red, he is re-hired with
probability zero. Outside managers are assumed to be distinct from outside investors.
In particular, this means that outside managers do not own shares.
Payo®s
Players' payo®s are calculated by discounting cash °ows at the rate r. If the ¯rm is up
and running, cash °ows at time t ¸ 0+ are
fcet; cIt; cmtg =
8<: f°L; (1¡ °)L; 0g if st = liquidatef(1¡ y1t + °y1t)¼1; (1¡ °)y1t¼1; 0g if t = 0+ or s¿ = retain 8¿ · tf°y2t¼2; (1¡ °)y2t¼2; (1¡ y2t)¼2g otherwise;
(1)
where cet, cIt, and cmt are the cash °ows to the entrepreneur, investors, and outside
managers, respectively. Furthermore, fcet; cIt; cmtg = f0; 0; 0g if the ¯rm is not up and
running, either because it has been liquidated, ¯nancing was not obtained, or R&D
was not done. So, conditional on the entrepreneur doing R&D and investors providing
¯nancing, payo®s are as follows for the entrepreneur, investors, and outside managers,
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respectively:
Ve = ¡K + ce0+ +
1X
t=1
cet
(1 + r)t
;
VI = ¡I + cI0+ +
1X
t=1
cIt
(1 + r)t
; and
Vm =
1X
t=1
cmt
(1 + r)t
:
Strategies and Equilibrium
We focus on subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies, which are determinis-
tic functions mapping the history of the game into the decision sets described above.
Throughout the paper, when we refer to a set of strategies as constituting \equilib-
rium," this means that the strategies are subgame perfect.
4 Subgame: Outside Manager Runs Firm
The analysis of the model proceeds recursively. Thus we start with the stage where
the ¯rm is up and running and the entrepreneur has been replaced with an outside
manager. We focus on going-concern equilibria in which the outside manager plays a
time invariate strategy so that y2t = y2;8t. This is a natural case to consider since
the model at this point is stationary and since outside managers are fundamentally
identical.4
We start the analysis by taking y2 as given and asking what is the best response for
shareholders. If shareholders never ¯re the current outside manager, they receive div-
idends of y2¼2 every period forever. Moreover, shareholders cannot improve upon this
by replacing the current manager, since any other outside manager would pay identical
dividends. Therefore, at any date, the shareholders' will refrain from liquidation only
if
y2¼2
1 + r
r
¸ L:
This can be rearranged as
rL
(1 + r)¼2
· y2; (2)
which shows that the investors' incentive compatibility constraint imposes a lower
bound on y2.
To get the sitting management to pay out y2¼2 at every date, as has been assumed
in (2), it is necessary for him to be punished in some way if he pays less. Since any
other outside manager is in principle as good as the current manager, it is credible
for shareholders to replace the current manager whenever he pays out less than y2¼2.
Moreover, this also minimizes the incentive for the current manager to pay out less. In
4At certain points below we also discuss equilibria involving time-varying strategies.
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short, a best reply for shareholders is to choose
st+1 =
8<: retain if y2t ¸ y2 and y2 ¸ rL=(1 + r)¼2replace if y2t < y2 and y2 ¸ rL=(1 + r)¼2
liquidate if y2 < rL=(1 + r)¼2.
(3)
Given that investors use (3), what is the best response of the current manager? This
depends on y2. If investors' incentive compatibility constraint (2) is not satis¯ed, the
best thing for the manager to do is to consume the entire current cash °ow himself, i.e.,
set y2t = 0, since shareholders will liquidate no matter what he does. More interestingly
when the investors' incentive compatibility constraint is satis¯ed, the current manager
knows that he will be retained as long as he pays a dividend of y2¼2. If so, he will
receive a constant consumption stream of (1 ¡ y2)¼2 from the current period on into
the future. His best alternative is to consume all the current cash °ow and be ¯red.
Thus the manager pays out y2¼2 only if
(1¡ y2)¼21 + r
r
¸ ¼2:
This can be written as
y2 · 1
1 + r
; (4)
which establishes that the manager's incentive compatibility constraint imposes an
upper bound on y2.
The LHS of the investors' incentive compatibility constraint (2) is increasing in r,
whereas the RHS of the manager's incentive compatibility constraint (4) is decreasing
in r. This contrast re°ects the con°icting objectives of investors and the manager.
For small discount rates, there are multiple payout ratios that simultaneously satisfy
both incentive compatibility constraints. However, no such payout ratios exists for
su±ciently high r. By equating the two expressions (2) and (4), we see that there is
an incentive compatible payout ratio if and only if r does not exceed
r¤ ´ ¼2
L
: (5)
This establishes the main part of the following lemma.5
Lemma 1 Suppose an outside manager has been appointed. There is a stationary
equilibrium in which the ¯rm is maintained as a going concern if and only if the discount
rate is less than r¤. The range of discount rates for which the ¯rm can be kept alive in
a non-stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is also [0; r¤]. Regardless of the discount
rate, it is also equilibrium for the manager to pay out nothing and for investors to
liquidate.
(The proof is completed in the appendix). Combined with the preceeding analysis,
Lemma 1 makes three main points: First, provided the discount rate is su±ciently
small, there are multiple stationary going concern equilibria, each corresponding to a
5Fluck's [1998] Proposition 2 is similar to our Lemma 1 .
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di®erent value of y2. However, nothing in the structure of the model allows us to say
with great con¯dence which of these equilibria will emerge. Recalling that y2 is the
rate of payout that shareholders would expect from a new manager, we can interpret y2
as an index of managerial moral hazard prevailing in the ¯rm's operating environment.
The case where y2 satis¯es the shareholders' incentive compatibility condition (2) with
equality corresponds to the case of \maximum managerial moral hazard" consistent
with the continued operation of the ¯rm under an outside manager. When y2 satis¯es
the manager's incentive compatibility condition (4) with equality, we have the case of
\minimum managerial moral hazard" consistent with the continued operation of the
¯rm under an outside manager. The multiplicity of equilibrium payout rates will lie
behind most of the important problems with equity discussed later.
Second, liquidation equilibria always exist regardless of the discount rate. The
extent to which this feeds back to the earlier stages of the model, including the ¯nancing
stage will be explored in subsequent sections.
Third, when r 2 (r¤; ¼2=(L¡ ¼2)) an ine±cient liquidation would de¯nitely occur.
The ine±ciency can be seen from the size of the threshold discount rate, r¤, being
lower than the yield that would accrue from maintaining the ¯rm as a going concern,
¼2=(L ¡ ¼2). The intuition relates to the managerial moral hazard problem arising
from the twin assumptions of non-contractibility and managerial self-interest. These
imply that at any time, at the very least, the manager's overall payo® must be equal
to the most he can take out of the ¯rm in the current period, i.e., ¼2. Therefore, at
most, outside investors receive an overall payo® which is equivalent to no dividend in
the current period and ¼2 forever thereafter. Since the opportunity cost of keeping the
¯rm alive is L, the maximum yield earned by outside investors is then ¼2=L.
5 Equilibria under Equity Financing: R&D, Financ-
ing, and Managerial Replacement
This section completes the analysis of equity ¯nancing by considering in turn, the
decision to replace the entrepreneur, the earlier IPO process, and ¯nally the initial
R&D decision.
Once ¯nancing has been raised and the capital investment has been made, there
are potentially two types of going concern equilibria: managerial (outside manager in
charge) and entrepreneurial (entrepreneur in charge). The social ¯rst best would be
to replace the entrepreneur by an outside manager as soon as possible. This is not
necessarily what will happen, nor is it necessarily desirable from the entrepreneur's
perspective ex ante. Which type of going concern equilibrium obtains, if any, depends
on the level of managerial moral hazard and the discount rate. Given stationarity
in the managerial subgame, if the entrepreneur prefers to cede management at date
t, then he also prefers to do so at date 1. In this case, the entrepreneur optimally
consumes the entire cash °ow produced at date 0+ and is replaced by outside investors
at date 1.
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5.1 The Replacement Decision
If the ¯rm were not viable as a going concern under outside management, the en-
trepreneur does not need to worry about being replaced. However, he does need to
worry about investors deciding to liquidate the ¯rm. In this case, our focus is on equi-
libria where the entrepreneur's strategy is to pay out a dividend of y1¼1 every period.
Using a similar argument as in Section 4, we can establish the following:
Lemma 2 Suppose the ¯rm would be liquidated under outside management. There
is an equilibrium in which the ¯rm is maintained as a going concern under the en-
trepreneur with a time invariant payout rate if and only if the discount rate is less than
R(°), where R(°) is increasing in the entrepreneur's shareholding, °, and R(0) = ¼1=L
and R(1) = ¼1=(L¡¼1). It is also impossible to keep the ¯rm alive for a larger discount
rate than R(°) when the equilibrium dividend payment is time dependent. Regardless
of the discount rate, it is also equilibrium for the entrepreneur to pay out nothing and
for investors to liquidate.
There is a slight di®erence between the current situation and that in Section 4. In
particular, the threat that currently hangs over the entrepreneur and drives him to
pay out y1¼1 in dividends every period is that the ¯rm will be liquidated if he does
not do so. In contrast, in Section 4, the threat faced by the outside manager who
had replaced the entrepreneur was that he, in turn, would be replaced by yet another
manager. This is °eshed out in the proof of Lemma 2. In other words, the lemma
shows that the threat of liquidation is just as e®ective as the threat of replacement by
an equally productive manager in supporting outside equity in a non-contractible cash
°ow model.
Another important message of Lemma 2 is that liquidation equilibria always exist
at the production stage. In this case, by our assumption that L · I, it would be
impossible to raise equity ¯nancing. This illustrates the fragility of equity ¯nancing.
Even when the discount rate is small, one cannot be sure that equity can be raised.
Next, we consider the more interesting case that the ¯rm is viable as a going concern
under outside management, because y2 satis¯es the incentive compatibility constraints
discussed above. In this case, the threat facing the entrepreneur is replacement by a
more able outside manager. Clearly, to avoid being replaced he must at the very least
match the dividends that investors expect that an outside manager would pay. Since
there is no reason for the entrepreneur to pay more than needed, this means that to
avoid being replaced, the entrepreneur must follow a strategy of paying a dividend of 6
y1¼1 = y2¼2 (6)
every period. When y2 is very high, it will be impossible for the entrepreneur to match
dividends, and so the entrepreneur will be replaced for sure at date 1. In this case, the
optimal action for the entrepreneur is to consume all cash °ows before being replaced.
6While one can construct equilibria where the entrepreneur must pay more in dividends than an
outsider manager would, we do not believe these equilibria are very reasonable. We therefore focus
on entrepreneurial equilibria with the matching condition (6).
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More generally, when y2 is su±ciently small that the entrepreneur is able to match,
the entrepreneur prefers to do so if and only if
(1¡ y1)¼11 + r
r
+ °y1¼1
1 + r
r
¸ ¼1 + °y2¼2
r
; (7)
where ° is the entrepreneur's shareholding. On the left hand side of this relation is
the present value of cash °ows to the entrepreneur from matching; where we have
used the fact that the stationarity of an outside manager's strategy implies that if the
entrepreneur prefers to match once, then he will do so forever. On the right hand side
is the current cash °ow plus the present value of the future equilibrium dividends the
entrepreneur will collect under an outside manager; here we have used the fact that if
the manager will be replaced next period, it is optimal for him to consume the entire
current cash °ows, ¼1. By substituting in y1¼1 = y2¼2, we can rewrite (7) as
y2 · ¼1
¼2[1 + (1¡ °)r] ; (8)
which shows that the entrepreneur will match provided y2 is su±ciently low, which is
intuitive.
But perhaps the most important lesson from (8) is that the entrepreneur may decide
not to match in some cases when the dividend paid by an outside investor is less than
the cash °ow that the entrepreneur would generate himself, i.e., in some cases when
y2¼2 < ¼1. This is the source of the ex post versus ex ante tension that exists under
equity ¯nancing. Ex ante , the entrepreneur would prefer the outside manager to run
the ¯rm if and only if the outside manager would pay larger dividends than what the
entrepreneur could generate himself, since this maximizes the size of the pie available
to the entrepreneur and investors and since investors' equilibrium slice of the pie is
a constant, I. But ex post, after investors have put up the cash required for capital
investments and received a ¯xed number of shares in return, the entrepreneur has an
incentive to exploit the non-contractibility of cash °ows by consuming all the cash
°ows that he generates. This will result in his replacement and therefore he loses
the ability to divert cash °ows to himself in the future, but the time value of money
may make it attractive nevertheless. This is most obvious when the outside manager's
payout ratio is so high that y2¼2 = ¼1. If the entrepreneur matches this, his perquisite
consumption is squeezed to zero. Therefore, in this case, the entrepreneur prefers to
pay out no dividends initially, diverting all of ¼1 to himself. Getting ¯red as a result of
this constitutes no loss to the entrepreneur, since he still collects the same dividends as
he would if he ran the ¯rm and matched the outside manager's dividends. Below, we
show how this tension between ex ante and ex post e±ciency is resolved in equilibrium.
5.2 Equilibrium Shareholdings
As seen in (8), whether or not the entrepreneur will match the anticipated dividends
of an outside manager depends upon the shareholdings of the entrepreneur. The lower
are his shareholdings, the less inclined will he be to match dividends. So whether we
have an entrepreneurial or managerial equilibrium depends upon the shareholdings of
the entrepreneur, which are determined at date 0+. But it is also true that this share-
holding depends upon whether investors anticipate an entrepreneurial or managerial
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equilibrium. For if the entrepreneur matches dividends, shareholders receive dividends
of y2¼2 every period forever, starting at date 0
+. In contrast, if the entrepreneur prefers
not to match dividends, shareholders only start to receive their y2¼2 dividend when
the outside manager comes along at date 1. Since, in equilibrium, outside shareholders
must receive shares worth I, we see that under an entrepreneurial equilibrium, the
entrepreneur's shareholding will be
°e = 1¡ rI
y2¼2(1 + r)
; (9)
and under a managerial equilibrium, the entrepreneur's shareholding will be
°m = 1¡ rI
y2¼2
: (10)
Notice that °m is higher than °e, which is intuitive since in a managerial equilibrium
shareholders start to receive dividends later than in an entrepreneurial equilibrium.
With these expressions in hand, we can go to examine the conditions under which the
entrepreneur will be successful in raising equity ¯nancing and under which there will
be an entrepreneurial or managerial equilibrium.
5.3 Financing and Entrepreneurial versus Managerial Equi-
libria
We continue to focus on the case that the ¯rm is viable as a going concern under outside
management.7 Since negative shareholdings are not possible, (10) shows that the
entrepreneur can successfully raise ¯nancing under a managerial equilibrium provided
that
y2 ¸ rI
¼2
: (11)
Recall now that keeping the ¯rm alive under an outside manager is only feasible if the
investors' and the outside manager's incentive compatibility constraints are satis¯ed.
The former, (2), puts a lower bound on y2 and the latter, (4), puts an upper bound on
y2. Condition (11) shows that raising ¯nancing under a managerial equilibrium raises
the lower bound on y2; i.e., it is \more di±cult" to raise ¯nancing than maintaining
the ¯rm as a going concern once it is up and running. Intuitively, the reason is the
delay in dividend payments under a managerial equilibrium that we discussed above.
Furthermore, combining (11) and the upper bound (4), we see that the largest discount
rate for which ¯nancing can be provided at date 0 under a managerial equilibrium, r¤m,
satis¯es
r¤m(1 + r
¤
m) ´
¼2
I
: (12)
Note that this implies that r¤m < r
¤, which means that it may be impossible to raise
equity ¯nancing under a managerial equilibrium even though the ¯rm can be main-
tained as a going concern under an outside manager. The (implicit) formula for the
7The case when outside management is not a viable alternative to entrepreneurial management is
dealt with in Lemma 2 and Theorem 1.
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threshold discount rate, r¤m, is quite intuitive. Under a managerial equilibrium there
are two sources of moral hazard. First, the entrepreneur consumes the entire date 0+
cash °ow; and second, the outside manager must receive compensation for not con-
suming the entire date 1 cash °ow. Hence, from investors perspective, this is the same
as saying that the ¯rst two cash °ows are lost, and equation (12) is an immediate
implication since investors need to break even. This also explains in an intuitive way
why r¤m < r
¤.
Turning now to the case that the entrepreneur is able to and prefers to match
dividends, (9) shows that the entrepreneur can successfully raise ¯nancing under an
entrepreneurial equilibrium provided that
y2 ¸ rI
(1 + r)¼2
: (13)
This puts a lower bound on y2. When this relation is satis¯ed as an equality, °e = 0. In
this case, the condition under which the entrepreneur prefers to match, (8), reduces to
y2 · ¼1=¼2(1¡ r), which puts an upper bound on y2. Equating this upper bound with
the lower bound in (13), we see that ¯nancing can be provided under an entrepreneurial
equilibrium provided that the discount rate is less than
r¤e ´ ¼1=I: (14)
Notice that this is less than or equal to the threshold for keeping the ¯rm alive under
the entrepreneur when it cannot be kept alive by an outside manager (see Lemma 2).
This shows that the range of discount rates for which an entrepreneurial equilibrium
can be supported is generally di®erent from the range of discount rates for which a
managerial equilibrium can be supported. More importantly, this also shows that there
is some irreducible form of moral hazard in our model, since both r¤m and r
¤
e are less
than the project's internal rate of return as of date 0+. Hence, not all positive NPV
investment projects can get ¯nancing.
We now have mapped out the critical elements of the model needed to pinpoint the
conditions under which ¯nancing can be raised and an entrepreneurial or managerial
equilibrium may obtain. This is put together and synthesised in the following theorem.
Theorem 1
(1) Suppose the ¯rm would be sustained as a going concern if an outside manager were
appointed.8 It is possible for the ¯rm to raise ¯nancing under a managerial equilibrium
if and only if (i) r · r¤m and (ii)
y2 ¸ ¼1
¼2
¡ r
2I
¼2
: (15)
It is possible for the ¯rm to raise ¯nancing under an entrepreneurial equilibrium if and
only if (iii) r · r¤e and (iv)
y2 · ¼1
¼2
¡ r
2I
(1 + r)¼2
: (16)
8This means that (2) and (4) hold.
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(2) Suppose the ¯rm would be liquidated if an outside manager were appointed. It is
possible for the entrepreneur to raise ¯nancing if and only if r · r¤e.
(3) For every discount rate, there is an equilibrium in which equity ¯nancing cannot be
raised.
Part (3) of the theorem illustrates the fragility problem with equity ¯nancing: even
for very low discount rates, it may be equilibrium for investors not to advance equity
capital, because subsequent moral hazard will be too large. In the case that ¯nancing
can be raised, Parts (1) and (2) show that entrepreneurial equilibria tend to obtain for
low y2's and small r's, whereas managerial equilibria obtain for high y2's and large r's.
This and other aspects of the theorem are illustrated in Figure 1.9
The shaded parts in Figure 1 represent the combinations of y2's and r's for which
equity ¯nancing can be raised. The ¯gure illustrates the point that not all positive
NPV projects can get ¯nancing, since the threshold discount rate, r¤m, is less than the
yield of the project, ¼2=(I ¡ ¼1), in the ¯rst best state.
A more subtle impediment to raising equity originates from the outside pressure
on the entrepreneur. Since equity investors have unconditional control rights, for the
entrepreneur to be retained as manager of the ¯rm, he needs to match the dividends
that investors would expect to receive from an outside manager. As shown in Figure 1,
if the entrepreneur attempts to match dividends when y2 is intermediate (\close to"
but less than ¼1=¼2), the present value of his future perk consumption becomes so small
that the entrepreneur prefers to pay out nil at date 0+ and be replaced at date 1. This
is an impediment to raising ¯nancing if reported cash °ows by outsiders alone are not
su±ciently large to cover the cost of investment. Figure 1 illustrates that this problem
becomes particularly acute at the ¯nancing stage when the discount rate is \large," as
shown by the non-shaded triangular region which is bounded below by line e, above by
c and to the right by r¤e . In this region, if the entrepreneur could commit to matching
dividends, ¯nancing would actually be available (since r · r¤e). The problem here is
that, once ¯nancing is obtained, the entrepreneur prefers to divert all initial cash °ows
to himself. Anticipating this, investors are not willing to advance ¯nancing in the ¯rst
place.
The intermediate moral hazard scenario shows that there can be a con°ict be-
tween e±ciency at the production and ¯nancing stages under equity ¯nancing. It also
illustrates that ex ante welfare can be reduced by the existence of managers with su-
9Figure 1 is drawn under the condition that ¼2 is so much larger than ¼1 that r
¤
m > r
¤
e . Note that
r¤m > r¤e if and only if (1 + ¼1=I)¼1=I < ¼2=I, that is, if and only if ¼2 > ¼1(1 + ¼1=I) = ¼1(1 + r¤e).
Figures for r¤e ¸ r¤m would look very similar. The comments in the text are not limited to the case
depicted. As noted in the legend for the ¯gure, lines a and b represent the incentive compatibility
constraints of an outside manager to pay out y2¼2 per period and of investors not to liquidate,
respectively. Hence the \triangle" formed by lines a and b represents the set of y2's and r's for
which the ¯rm can be maintained as a going concern by an outside manager. Lines a and c form
a smaller \triangle" representing the set of y2's and r's for which ¯nancing can be raised if the ¯rm
will subsequently be run by an outside manager. Line c lies above line b because in a managerial
equilibrium, the entrepreneur consumes the entire date 0+ cash °ow, whereas the outside manager will
be paying out y2¼2 from period 1 onwards. Additionally, if y2 is above line b, ¯nancing can be raised
in an entrepreneurial equilibrium. If y2 is below line e, the entrepreneur prefers not to relinquish
control if investors think that he will not. If y2 is above line f, the entrepreneur prefers to relinquish
control if investors think that he will do so.
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perior abilities, since if outside managers had the same ability as the entrepreneur,
the entrepreneur would never relinquish control in equilibrium. Of course, in an en-
trepreneurial equilibrium, there is social ine±ciency at the production stage since sec-
ond stage growth is not implemented.
The crucial property which drives these results is that the incumbent manager who
sees that his days are numbered will act so as to maximize his short-term bene¯ts. In
the current model this is limited to consuming all the cash °ows during one period.
More generally there may be a substantial delay between the decision to ¯re the incum-
bent and the arrival of his replacement. During this period there may be a substantial
loss of value for outside investors. The longer is this period, or the longer is the initial
period when the entrepreneur is the only one who can run the ¯rm, the larger is the
problematic region of intermediate moral hazard discussed above.
5.4 The R&D Decision
We close the analysis of the model under equity ¯nancing by addressing the question
as to whether, at time 0, the budding entrepreneur will do R&D. The ¯rst best is for
him to do so whenever NPV is positive, i.e.,
¼1 + ¼2=r ¸ I +K: (17)
The ¯rst criterion that must be satis¯ed in order for the entrepreneur to be willing to
do R&D is that ¯nancing can be raised. Conditional upon that, if the entrepreneur
anticipates that a managerial equilibrium obtains, the entrepreneur is willing to do
R&D if and only if
¼1 +
y2¼2
r
¸ I +K; (18)
since, in equilibrium, investors will have shares worth exactly I at date 0+ [see (10)].
Similarly, under an entrepreneurial equilibrium, the entrepreneur is willing to do
R&D if and only if ¯nancing can be raised and
¼1 +
¼1
r
¸ I +K: (19)
The ¯rst thing to note from these three equations is that ¯rst best is not achieved
at the R&D stage since y2 · 1=(1 + r) [by (4)]. Hence, some R&D opportunities with
\low" NPV's will be foregone by the entrepreneur, since the returns to the entrepreneur
are too low to cover his cost of R&D. Under outside equity ¯nancing in our model, the
non-contractibility of cash °ows means that there is an irreducible amount of moral
hazard which ultimately leads to underinvestment in R&D.
The three equations also illustrate that equilibrium underinvestment in R&D relates
to the degree of moral hazard associated with an outside manager. First, when moral
hazard is \high" (y2 is \low"), the entrepreneur anticipates that he will not be replaced
by an outside manager once the ¯rm is up and running, however, his share of the cash
°ows may not be su±cient to cover the cost of R&D. This can be seen immediately
from (19).
Second, when moral hazard is \low" (y2 is \high"), the entrepreneur anticipates that
he eventually will be replaced by an outside manager, however, his initial perquisite
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consumption plus his share of future dividends may not cover his R&D costs. This
can be seen from (18), since incentive compatibility requires y2 < 1. Intuitively, what
happens here is that hiring an outside manager creates a deadweight cost equal to the
present value of the outside manager's on-the-job perk consumption. This can be seen
by observing that (18) can be rewritten as
¼1 +
¼2
r
¸ I +K + (1¡ y2)¼2
r
:
The ¯nal term is the value of the outside manager's perk °ow. This contrasts with an
entrepreneurial equilibrium where all cash °ows generated by the project go either to
the entrepreneur or to investors, who are compensated for a large perk consumption
by the entrepreneur through a high shareholding. In contrast, the entrepreneur has no
recourse to compensation from the outside manager's perk consumption. Put another
way, if the entrepreneur will be replaced by the e±cient outside manager starting in
t = 1, the entrepreneur will not internalize the consumption of future perquisites in
his decision making. As a result, underinvestment in R&D may occur.
Third, when moral hazard is \intermediate" (y2 is intermediate), there is a tension
between ex post and ex ante e±ciency. In this case, when y2¼2 is \close to" but less
than ¼1, managerial equilibria tend to occur, as illustrated in Figure 1. What happens
here is that once ¯nancing has been sunk and investors' shareholding has been ¯xed,
the entrepreneur maximizes his wealth by relinquishing control, since in doing so, he
gets to divert all the initial cash °ows to himself. This ex post maximization by the
entrepreneur is also socially ex post e±cient, since the outside manager generates larger
cash °ows. However, a simple comparison of (18) and (19) shows that from an ex ante
perspective, this can be ine±cient since it reduces the incentive to do R&D.
As was emphasized in the introduction, one of our main objectives in this paper
has been to understand how problems in ¯nancial contracting can impact on growth.
The results of this section show the complex nature of these relations. On the one
hand managerial moral hazard may reduce the incentive for shareholders to grow the
¯rm by appointing more able outside management. On the other hand contracting
arrangements which make it easy to improve the ¯rm by changing management may
discourage the creation of growth opportunities in the ¯rst place. Stated otherwise,
entrenchment has both its negative side and its positive side. Agents may be willing to
take the steps necessary to develop new lines of business only if the ¯nancial structure
assures that they will retain e®ective control of the ¯rm (and have privileged access to
its cash °ows) for a su±ciently long time once the project is underway.
6 Debt Financing
In this section we study debt which is the main alternative to outside equity ¯nancing.
We will not obtain a full-blown theory of capital structure. However, it should be
noted that if the capital investment is ¯nanced by debt and subsequently the ¯rm
operates under entrepreneurial management, the ¯rm's capital structure consists of
debt and inside equity. Alternatively, if the ¯rm is ¯nanced by debt and has an outside
manager, its capital structure consists of debt and outside equity (either held by the
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original entrepreneur or by other investors if the entrepreneur cashes out). We will ask
whether debt ¯nancing will be able to eliminate any of the possible ine±ciencies we
found with outside equity. We will ¯nd that the answer is yes, possibly, but that other
ine±ciencies will emerge.
In models of debt, it is widely recognized that often important results turn on
whether or not debt contracts are renegotiable and whether or not there are bankruptcy
costs. In particular, Bolton and Scharfstein [1996] and Franks and Nyborg [1996] have
demonstrated that a complex debt structure can make debt hard to renegotiate (see
also BerglÄof and von Thadden [1994]). In practice, complexity can result from having
multiple creditors, multiple layers of seniority, and multiple and fragmented collateral.10
In this paper, we will focus on the case that the ¯rm has a debt structure that is so
complex as to be non-renegotiable. As a consequence, failure to service debt results in
the liquidation of the ¯rm. Claimants share in the liquidation value according to strict
absolute priority. We choose this model of debt not because it is necessarily the most
commonly observed form of debt, but because it will bring out clearly some important
di®erences relative to equity ¯nancing. We will comment below on the extent to which
results may change under alternative speci¯cations of debt contracts, which may or
may not be more relevant to a particular institutional context.
In terms of the timing of events, the model under debt ¯nancing parallels the equity
¯nancing model. However, since the debt is complex, failure to service the debt in full
leads to liquidation. From time t = 1 onwards, the stage game proceeds as follows:
(i) The entrepreneur decides whether to appoint a new manager.11 (ii) Cash °ows are
produced. If an outside manager has been appointed, the manager reports a cash °ow
y2t¼2. (iii) The entrepreneur decides whether to service the debt or default.
12 If he
defaults, the ¯rm will be liquidated. Since there is no bene¯t from defaulting partially,
the entrepreneur's choice is between paying zero or the contractual debt service in full.
Thus under debt ¯nancing and outside management, the ¯rm is doubly exposed to
moral hazard. First, there is the risk that managers will consume perquisites and under-
report true cash °ows. Second, there is the risk that the shareholder/entrepreneur may
prefer to consume all the reported cash °ows rather than service the debt.
Since in our model, the project has an in¯nite life, the range of discount rates for
which debt can be raised is maximized by considering perpetual debt. Furthermore,
since the entrepreneur generates lower cash °ows than outside managers, it is natural to
consider debt contracts which may include an initial \grace period", where contractual
debt service is reduced. Therefore, we consider debt contracts where the ¯rm promises
to pay a coupon of d0 in the initial period and a coupon of d1 ¸ d0 in all subsequent
periods. We are interested in equilibria in which the ¯rm is kept alive forever, i.e. in
which there is no default. In such equilibria,
I = d0 +
d1
r
:
10For example, in Germany the fact that the vast majority of all ¯rms in ¯nancial distress in the
past have ended up closing down has been attributed to a high fragmentation of collateral among
multiple creditors (see Franks, Nyborg, and Torous [1996]).
11It is never bene¯cial for the entrepreneur to decide to liquidate the ¯rm.
12Since the entrepreneur is the sole shareholder, he controls the board of directors and therefore
the debt service decision.
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So in the special case that d0 = d1 = d, the coupon every period is
d =
Ir
1 + r
: (20)
If d · ¼1, a grace period is not necessary, nor would it have any bene¯t. We have:
Lemma 3 It is feasible for the entrepreneur to service debt where there is no grace
period if and only if the discount rate is less than or equal to the yield of the project
under the entrepreneur. That is, ¼1 > Ir=(1 + r) i® r · Á, where Á ´ ¼1=(I ¡ ¼1). 13
If r > Á, it is not feasible for the entrepreneur to service the debt at date 0+ unless d0
is reduced. In such cases, we assume that d0 = ¼1 since this maximizes return to cred-
itors and therefore reduces any underinvestment problem arising from the feasibility
constraint.14 In this case,
d1 = (I ¡ ¼1)r; (21)
which is indeed greater than d0 whenever r > Á. We will see below when, in equilibrium,
a grace period will be used. As before, we focus on stationary subgame perfect equilibria
where outside managers use a constant payout ratio. Also, as before, we will see that
there are numerous equilibria, depending on y2.
6.1 The Replacement Decision
Observe ¯rst that a necessary condition for a managerial equilibrium is that an outside
manager would place a greater cash °ow in the entrepreneur's hand than what he could
generate himself, that is,
y2¼2 > ¼1: (22)
This is in sharp contrast to the result under equity ¯nancing, where a managerial
equilibrium could obtain even if y2¼2 < ¼1. This re°ects the combined e®ects of
di®erences in control and cash °ows rights between debt and equity. If the entrepreneur
uses equity ¯nancing, he loses the right to decide over the use of corporate resources,
including his own replacement decision. If it becomes too onerous for him to match
the dividends that would be paid by an outside manager, the entrepreneur will simply
pay no dividends and instead consume all current cash °ows before getting replaced by
an outside manager next period. In contrast, under debt ¯nancing, the entrepreneur
makes the decision whether to replace himself and whether to service debt (which here
is less critical). Given y2, at any time t ¸ 1, the replacement decision is basically a
decision between a pre debt service cash °ow of y2¼2 versus ¼1. So, in equilibrium,
the entrepreneur replaces himself if and only if (22) holds, since the contractual debt
service is independent of reported cash °ows.
13Proof: In (20), set d = ¼1 and rearrange.
14The qualitative results are not a®ected by the choice of d0 · ¼1.
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6.2 Debt Service and Financing
Consider ¯rst the case that y2¼2 · ¼1 so that the entrepreneur would not replace
himself with an outside manager. We are interested in conditions for debt service. In
this case, there is no need for a grace period, so the coupon is given by (20). Hence,
the entrepreneur will service this debt if and only if·
¼1 ¡ Ir
1 + r
¸
1 + r
r
¸ ¼1; (23)
since the entrepreneur's best alternative at any given time is to consume the entire cash
°ow and see the ¯rm liquidated. Note that (23) is equivalent to saying that r · r¤e [see
(14)]. An important observation here is therefore that if r · r¤e then debt ¯nancing
de¯nitely can be raised. This contrasts with our result under equity ¯nancing which says
that it is possible to raise equity ¯nancing if and only if r¤e . This contrast has its roots
in the limited control rights of debt versus equity. Under equity ¯nancing, there are
numerous equilibria in the subgame after ¯nancing has been raised, depending upon the
payout rates used by the entrepreneur (and outside managers). Liquidation equilibria
always exist because the entrepreneur cannot be sure that outside investors will not
replace him or liquidate the ¯rm, which they can do because as equityholders they
have unconditional control rights. In contrast, under debt ¯nancing, the entrepreneur
knows that as long as he services the debt, he will remain in charge, since creditors
only have conditional control rights; they are activated only in the event of a default.
As a result, when r · r¤e , all players know that the entrepreneur will service the debt
and so ¯nancing can be raised for sure.
Consider next the case that y2¼2 ¸ ¼1 so that the entrepreneur would replace himself
with an outside manager. Note ¯rst that not all \large" y2's would be consistent with
equilibrium. First, the manager must prefer reporting y2¼2 to reporting nothing and
thereby precipitating the liquidation of the ¯rm, i.e.,
y2 · 1
1 + r
: (24)
This is just as in the case of equity ¯nancing. Second, given that the outside manager
reports y2¼2 > d1, the shareholder/entrepreneur must do better by servicing the debt
than defaulting and seeing the ¯rm terminated, i.e.,
(y2¼2 ¡ d1)1 + r
r
¸ y2¼2: (25)
The manager recognizes that if he reports a cash °ow that is too low, the share-
holder/entrepreneur will prefer to default on the debt contract, leading to the liq-
uidation of the ¯rm and the loss of perks to the manager. Hence, a going concern
equilibrium under an outside manager is possible only if
d1(1 + r)
¼2
· y2 · 1
1 + r
: (26)
Of course, to raise ¯nancing in the ¯rst place, it must also be the case that before
replacing himself (at date 1), the entrepreneur must prefer servicing debt at date 0+.
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Hence, we must also have
¼1 ¡ d0 + y2¼2 ¡ d1
r
¸ ¼1: (27)
Since d0 · d1, we see that (27) is satis¯ed whenever (25) and (22) are satis¯ed, implying
that the entrepreneur will wish to service debt initially if he will also do so once an
outside manager has been appointed. Therefore, if no grace period is needed, (25) tells
us that there is y2 such that it is incentive compatible to service debt if and only if
r · r¤m [see (12)], which parallels the result under equity ¯nancing.
The following theorem summarizes the analysis so far and completes the analysis
in the case that a grace period is needed.
Theorem 2
(1) Suppose r¤m · Á. It is possible to raise complex debt ¯nancing in a managerial
equilibrium if and only if r · r¤m. In a managerial equilibrium, there is no grace period
and y2 satis¯es (22) and (26), with d1 = d as given by (20).
(2) Suppose r¤m > Á. There is Á
¤ 2 (Á; r¤m) such that it is possible to raise complex
debt ¯nancing in a managerial equilibrium if and only if r · Á¤. In a managerial
equilibrium, there is a grace period i® r > Á and y2 satis¯es (22) and (26), with d1
given by (20) if r · Á and (21) if r 2 (Á; Á¤].
(3) The entrepreneur will raise complex debt ¯nancing under an entrepreneurial equi-
librium if and only if r · r¤e and the conditions for a managerial equilibrium in (1) or
(2) are not satis¯ed.
Theorem 2 when r¤m > Á is summarized in Figure 2. The ¯gure shows that managerial
equilibria tend to occur for large payout rates and entrepreneurial equilibria tend to
occur for small payout rates. 15 This parallels what we saw in Section 5 under equity
¯nancing (Figure 1).
6.3 The Contrast Between Debt and Equity
The equity analysis showed that, beyond the intrinsic moral hazard problem that exists
in our model, equity ¯nancing has two main problems.
Time inconsistency: Comparing Figures 1 and 2 (and Theorems 1 and 2) we see
that under debt ¯nancing, we never get a managerial equilibrium when y2¼2 < ¼1. In
contrast, this can happen under equity ¯nancing. Hence there is no time inconsistency
problem under debt ¯nancing.
This di®erence between debt and equity emerge in our model primarily because of
di®erences in control rights. Under equity ¯nancing, investors have unconditional con-
trol rights and the cash °ows they receive are highly sensitive to reported cash °ows.
Hence, if the entrepreneur tries to stay on as manager he will ¯nd his perk consumption
squeezed by the threat of being replaced by an outside manager. In the face of this,
the entrepreneur often will prefer to cede control, consume as much as he can before
he is replaced and bene¯t from the future dividends given that he is a shareholder.
In contrast, under debt ¯nancing, since creditors have conditional control rights, the
15This is also true when Á ¸ r¤m.
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entrepreneur need only meet contractual debt service to assure that he continues to
manage the ¯rm inde¯nitely into the future. This is less onerous than matching divi-
dends.16 Furthermore, under complex debt, the consequences of consuming maximum
perks are harsher. The ¯rm is liquidated and the entrepreneur loses all further bene¯ts.
The upshot is that debt promotes entrenchment. The entrepreneur's incentive to do
R&D is enhanced and therefore ex ante e±ciency is improved.
Fragility: As shown in Lemma 2, for any discount rate, once equity ¯nancing
has been raised and the capital investment has been sunk, there is an equilibrium in
the ensuing subgame in which the ¯rm is liquidated immediately. In this case, equity
¯nancing will of course not be advanced in the ¯rst place and, anticipating this, the
entrepreneur will not do R&D. In contrast, complex debt ¯nancing can always be raised
when r · r¤e .
This contrast also arises because of the di®erent control rights bestowed upon in-
vestors by debt and equity. Investors advance equity ¯nancing if they believe that
dividends, either under the entrepreneur or an outside manager, will be large enough
to cover the cost of investment. Conversely, the entrepreneur or an alternative man-
ager, will pay out these dividends if he believes that investors will not replace him or
liquidate the ¯rm. The repeated interaction between the players creates a self-enforcing
mechanism that fosters the virtuous cycle of beliefs. However, this is a fragile mecha-
nism, and a vicious cycle can emerge as well. Since equity investors have unconditional
control rights, they can replace the incumbent at any time, and they will do so if they
believe that he will not pay out su±ciently large dividends in the future. Conversely, if
the incumbent thinks that he will be replaced, he will not pay out any dividends to eq-
uity investors. By giving investors control rights only in the case of default, debt breaks
this vicious circle of mistrust. The upshot is that debt ¯nancing can be raised whenever
it is in the entrepreneur's unilateral interest to service it, i.e., whenever r · r¤e .
However, debt does not dominate equity because it has drawbacks as well, as seen
by a comparison between Figures 1 and 2. Speci¯cally, when r¤m > Á, the maximum
discount rate for which debt ¯nancing can be raised may be less than the maximum
discount rate for which equity ¯nancing can be raised. Intuitively, this happens because
when r¤m > Á a grace period is needed and this involves increasing subsequent coupons
to compensate for lowering the initial coupon. Hence, the double moral hazard problem
of debt becomes more severe. Hence, equity is (weakly) preferred when discount rates
are relatively high while debt is (weakly) preferred when discount rates are low.
In comparing the growth implications of debt versus equity, we see that debt pro-
motes the creation of growth opportunities, possibly at the expense of e±ciency once
the ¯rm is up and running. The reason is that debt allows the entrepreneur to entrench
himself and therefore encourages him to do R&D in the ¯rst place. In contrast, equity
promotes the implementation of improvements, possibly at the expense of the creation
of growth opportunities. In sum, debt favours ¯rst stage growth; equity favour second
stage growth.
As discussed in Section 2, our model delivers a result which bears super¯cial resem-
blance to Jensen's [1986] free cash °ow hypothesis. In particular, debt tends to have an
16Fluck [1999] argues that an advantage of the unconditional control rights of equity is that it allows
investors to punish managers for things like not maintaining plant and machinery to an appropriate
standard.
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advantage over outside equity when outside managerial moral hazard is relatively large
(y2 < ¼1=¼2). However, we reach this conclusion in a dynamic analysis that allows
us to model outside equity and which highlights the importance of control rights in
¯nancial contracting.17
To what extent are our results driven by the assumption that debt structure is
complex? To address this, suppose instead that debt structure is \simple", in the
sense that creditors are su±ciently coordinated to negotiate with equityholders and
to take over the ¯rm upon default and run it as a going concern. More precisely, if
the ¯rm defaults creditors can either (i) do nothing, (ii) liquidate, or (iii) take over
the ¯rm and keep it going under (possibly) new management. The general conclusion
here is that simple and complex debt are approximately the same. They di®er only
if the entrepreneur has a chance of being retained as manager upon default. When
this is not the case, the entrepreneur's and outside managers' debt servicing incentive
compatibility constraints would be the same whether we are dealing with complex or
simple debt, since the defaulting manager would not be retained by creditors. Thus
when there are alternative outside managers as in our model, the important di®erence
between debt and equity lies in the conditionality of control rights under debt { not in
the hardness of the claim.
As we have already noted, our model does not state how a particular equity payout
policy will be determined. It may be that the prevailing degree of moral hazard in
the economy re°ects cultural factors or, as has been stressed by La Porta et al [1998],
legal factors. If so, our model tell us something about the kind of contracting that will
arise. When managerial moral hazard is great, we would expect debt contracts to be
relatively common and outside equity ¯nance relatively uncommon. In contrast, when
managerial moral hazard problems are less severe, then outside equity may be relatively
more widespread. Some readers may see here the makings of an explanation for why
equity markets have recently emerged in some developing economies where previously
they did not exist. In addition to the explanation that liberalization may have removed
administrative obstacles, our analysis here suggests an alternative explanation. Specif-
ically, the hypothesis would be that institutional changes have provided shareholders
greater means of disciplining managers and that ¯nancing shifted from debt to equity
as a result. Exploring this idea would take us very far from our analytical framework,
so we do not pursue it here.
7 Extensions
7.1 Alternative Financial Contracts
We feel that our study of debt and equity contracts has been useful in demonstrat-
ing ine±ciencies that arise in dynamic agency models and their implications for ¯rm
growth. This is not meant to say that alternative ¯nancial contracts cannot alleviate
these ine±ciencies in some contexts. Indeed, given our understanding of the structure
of our model it is an interesting exercise to see what some more complex contract can
17Of course, the importance of conditional control rights has been emphasized in the static, incom-
plete contracts literature, for example, by Aghion and Bolton [1992].
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achieve. For example, a problem with outside equity that has not been resolved by debt
is the fact that minimum moral hazard [y2 = 1=(1+ r)] cannot be enforced. As seen in
Figure 2, there is a wide range of equilibrium payout rates also under debt ¯nancing.
Here, we ask the question whether there is some contractual modi¯cation that can si-
multaneously eliminate the time inconsistency and fragility problems of outside equity,
guarantee minimum moral hazard, and eliminate the double moral hazard problem of
debt. The answer is \yes"; this can be achieved by doing a leveraged buyout (LBO) at
date 1. By selling his equity stake to an outside manager and taking debt in return,
the entrepreneur creates a single layer of agency. Furthermore, by setting the debt at a
su±ciently high level, the entrepreneur can assure minimum managerial moral hazard
under an outside manager.
The LBO would work as follows: The ¯rm initially issues debt at date 0+ which
raises I. Denote the contractual debt service of this debt by ds0 and d
s
1. Then d
s
1 =
(I ¡ ds0)r. At date 1, the entrepreneur hires an outside manager and simultaneously
exchanges his equity for (junior) debt and gives all the equity to the new manager.
Let dj1 denote contractual debt service on the entrepreneur's (junior) debt. Minimum
moral hazard can be forced by setting: dj1 =
¼2
1+r
¡ds1. Thus, the total debt outstanding
as of date 1 will be ¼2=r. This will maximize cash °ows to the entrepreneur, subject
to incentive compatibility, and therefore maximizes his incentives to do R&D.
This bene¯t from an LBO in our basic framework should not be viewed as a state-
ment about the general optimality of LBO's. If the model were enhanced to be more
realistic, we would see that there are countervailing costs associated with that ¯nancial
structure. The important point is that the fundamental ine±ciencies we have identi¯ed
will continue to be present in these more realistic settings.
7.2 Uncertainty
Probably the most obvious limitation to our analysis is that we have worked in a
perfect foresight setting. For example, it is clear that stochastic cash °ows could add an
important disadvantage to complex debt because unexpectedly low cash °ows may lead
to the liquidation of the ¯rm. This might create a role for simple debt structures, since
the conditionality of control rights would be retained while introducing the °exibility
to handle temporary downturns in business conditions.
7.3 Shocks
Short of a full analysis of uncertainty it is interesting to step back slightly from the
perfect foresight setting we have adopted in our analysis and ask what is the e®ect
of a shock to the parameters of the model. In particular, imagine that the ¯rm is
operating under entrepreneurial management, the investors have just decided to retain
the entrepreneur one more period, but that this period's cash °ow has not yet been
realised. Suppose at this time there is a discovery of a technological improvement which
could only be implemented by outside managers. That is, outsiders' productivity is
increased to ¼¤2 > ¼2. If under this new condition it is clear that shareholders will
replace the entrepreneur, his reaction will be to consume all the current period's cash
°ow. It is interesting to note that this may reduce the value of shares immediately
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upon the announcement of the technical improvement. For the value of shares just
prior to the announcement is
y2¼2(1 + r)
r
:
Just after the announcement it is
y2¼
¤
2
r
:
Next period its value will be
y2¼
¤
2(1 + r)
r
:
If ¼2(1 + r) > ¼
¤
2 share prices fall initially upon the announcement and then subse-
quently rise to a new higher level when ¯nally the improvement is put into place.18
8 Conclusion
Despite a number of important contributions to the theory of dynamic capital structure,
we are still looking for a coherent vision of how ¯nancial structure evolves over the life
of the ¯rm in response to growth opportunities and to changing managerial needs.
Our contribution has been to study the two-way causality between the creation of
growth opportunities and ¯nancial contracting. Through our model we have told a
story which we believe repeats itself continually in many ¯rms in many economies.
The main features of this story are as follows. At some point insiders in the ¯rm
perceive the possibility of developing a growth opportunity. If they pursue this and
have a new product idea in hand, they would need to change the ¯rm by calling upon
some outsiders to provide additional ¯nance for capital investments and other outsiders
to provide managerial expertise. Once the new direction would be taken, the initial
insiders may ¯nd themselves increasingly alienated from the ¯rm they have created.
At some point it may become apparent that they lack the vision or the clout to shape
the way the new ¯rm should develop. They are as Coriolanus who, after leading the
Volscian forces in imposing the new order on Rome, is e®aced in a maneuver which
exceeds his understanding.
Financial contracts are an important part of the story notably because they can
determine who will retain e®ective control of the ¯rm along the path that is pursued. A
contract that allows initial insiders to entrench themselves cuts two ways with respect
to the growth of the ¯rm. On the one hand it encourages growth by allowing the
initiators of a new product idea to reap for a longer time the bene¯ts accruing to
insiders. On the other hand, the entrenchment of an earlier generation of insiders may
impede the introduction of improvements that are needed to allow a product to attain
its full commercial potential.
Our model has been kept simple. The initial insiders are represented as a sin-
gle entrepreneur who has the opportunity of creating a product idea for sure if he
18This feature of our model corresponds to the argument of Hobijn and Jovanovic [1999] in their
analysis of the evolution of the stock market since the 1970's. Their thesis is that the prospect of new
information technology many incumbent ¯rms who were ill-placed to bene¯t from new technologies
adopted defensive strategies which reduced values of traded shares. Only later as these ¯rms were
restructured or new ¯rms entered the stock market did the stock market take o®.
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undertakes a costly R&D project. Later, given the project is up and running, the
product can be \improved" by replacing the entrepreneur by a more skilled outside
manager. Moreover, we have worked in a framework where cash °ows are completely
non-contractible. We have shown that under equity ¯nancing there is substantial out-
side pressure on the entrepreneur, since he has to match the expected dividends of the
more skilled outside managers in order to retain his job. This pressure leads to a time
inconsistency problem and reduces the entrepreneur's incentive to R&D. Debt resolves
the time inconsistency problem and enhances the incentive to do R&D because debt
gives investors control rights only in the event of default, thus reducing the outside
pressure on the entrepreneur.
Another problem with the unconditional control rights of equity is that it may
foster a vicious circle where managers pay no dividends and investors liquidate. Debt
¯nancing breaks this vicious circle because managers need not fear liquidation, provided
that they service debt. Balanced against these advantages, the main drawback of debt
is that it tends to sti°e second stage growth. Debt may also introduce a double moral
hazard problem, which reduces the range of discount rates for which it is possible to
obtain debt ¯nancing relative to the range for which it is possible to obtain equity
¯nancing.
It would be interesting to enrich the analysis in any of a variety of ways. We have
already mentioned that it would be desirable to introduce uncertainty about cash °ows
or other aspects of the project. Not only would this be important in better assessing
the relative bene¯ts of outside equity, debt or other ¯nancial contracts; but it would
establish a link to contingent claims valuation (see Anderson and Sundaresan [1996]).
Another interesting line of research would be to model the creation of growth opportu-
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
All that remains to show is subgame perfection, the claim regarding non-stationary
strategies, and the existence of liquidation equilibria.
Subgame Perfection
First, since investors su®er no loss in payo® from replacing incumbent management,
they have a credible threat to ¯re the incumbent if he should choose a payout ratio
below y2. The incumbent therefore cannot bene¯t from paying a lower dividend than
y2¼2 (when (4) holds). Second, since there is an in¯nitely deep pool of alternative man-
agers, the principle of induction establishes that the alternative manager also cannot
do better than by playing the same strategy as the incumbent; the alternative manager
is only placed in charge if the incumbent deviates, moreover, once this happens, the
alternative simply becomes the new incumbent and is indistinguishable from the pre-
vious manager. Third, since outside managers use the same strategy, investors cannot
gain by replacing the incumbent when he adheres to his strategy by paying out y2¼2.
This establishes subgame perfection.
Non-Stationary Strategies
We want to show that if there is a going concern equilibrium where outside managers
use a strategy with time variant payout ratios fy2tg, then there is also an equilibrium
with a time invariant payout ratio, ¹y, which leaves all players equally well o®. In the
non-stationary going concern equilibrium, at date ¿ , the overall payo® to the incumbent
manager is
1X
t=¿
·
(1¡ y2t)¼2
(1 + r)t¡¿
¸
;
the overall payo® to outside shareholders is
1X
t=¿
y2t(1¡ °)¼2
(1 + r)t¡¿
;
and the overall payo® to the alternative manager is zero. These payo®s are identical
to the payo®s from a time-invariant payout ratio of
¹y =
1X
t=¿
·
y2t
(1 + r)t¡¿
¸
:
Therefore, if the incentive compatibility constraints are satis¯ed under the time-invariant
payout ratios at date ¿ , they are also satis¯ed under the constant payout ratio, ¹y at
date ¿ and at every other date. This is what we wanted to show, since an equilib-
rium where some outside managers use di®erent strategies and the incumbent will be
replaced at some point makes the incumbent's incentive compatibility constraint more
stringent, leading to a threshold discount rate which is less than r¤.
Liquidation Equilibria Finally note that if investors always liquidate then a best
response for the manager is to pay out nothing, and vice versa. It is straightforward
that these strategies are subgame perfect. 2
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Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose the entrepreneur uses a strategy under which
y1t =
½
y1 if t = 0
+ or [ y1¿ ¸ y1 8¿ < t]
0 if y1¿ = y1 for some ¿ < t.
(28)
Since the ¯rm is not viable as a going concern under an outside manager, the best
reply of investors is to choose
st+1 =
½
retain if y1t ¸ y1 and y1 ¸ rL=(1 + r)¼1 and [ y1¿ ¸ y1 8¿ < t]
liquidate if y1 < rL=(1 + r)¼1 or [y1¿ = y1 for some ¿ < t.]
(29)
Given (29), at any time the entrepreneur prefers paying out y1 forever as compared
with paying out nothing and bringing about the liquidation of the ¯rm provided that
(1¡ y1)¼1 + r
r
+ °y1¼
1 + r
r
¸ ¼ + °L;
which simpli¯es to
y1 ·
1¡ °Lr
(1+r)¼
(1¡ °)(1 + r) : (30)
In other words, (28) and (29) are best replies to each other if and only if (30) holds.
Observe now that RHS(30) is decreasing in r while rL=(1 + r)¼1 is increasing in r,
and there is y1 which simultaneously satis¯es (30) and y1 ¸ rL=(1 + r)¼1 if and only
if r · R(°), where R(°) is implicitly de¯ned by
¼1=L = R(°)(1¡ °) + °R(°)=(1 +R(°)): (31)
From this expression, we see that R(0) = ¼=L, R(1) = ¼=(L¡ ¼), and
R0(°) =
R(°)2(1 +R(°))
°(1¡ °) > 0:
We have shown that there is y1 such that (28) and (29) are best replies to each other and
the ¯rm is not liquidated when these strategies are employed if and only if r · R(°).
Subgame perfection follows by inspection of these strategies, and the claim regarding
non-stationary strategies and the existence of liquidation equilibria follow along the
same lines as in the proof of Lemma 1. 2
Proof of Theorem 1
Part (1): Most of the theorem is already established in the text. To complete the
proof, suppose that y2 is such that the ¯rm is viable as a going concern under an
outside manager. Substituting in the expression for °e into (8), we see that there is an
entrepreneurial equilibrium if r · r¤e and
y2 · ¼1
¼2
¡ r
2I
(1 + r)¼2
:
Next, substituting in the expression for °m into (8), we see that there is a managerial
equilibrium if r · r¤m and
y2 ¸ ¼1
¼2
¡ r
2I
¼2
:
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Part (1) of the theorem now follows by the discussion in the text.
Part (2): Denote the largest discount rate for which ¯nancing can be obtained by
rmax. To ¯nd rmax, Lemma 2 shows that we need only consider strategies where the
equilibrium payout rate is time invariant. Denote it by y1. When the ¯rm is kept
alive forever by the entrepreneur under this payout ratio, the shareholding of the
entrepreneur is
° = 1¡ rI
y1¼1(1 + r)
: (32)
In the remainder of this proof, ° will be taken to be de¯ned by this equation. Notice
that ° is decreasing in r and increasing in y1. Hence rmax is the largest r for which there
is y1 such that °(y1; r) ¸ 0 and the ¯rm can be maintained as a going concern under
the entrepreneur after ¯nancing has been raised given r and y1. We want to show that
rmax = ¼1=I. Recall from Lemma 2 that the threshold discount rate for which the ¯rm
can be kept alive after ¯nancing has been raised, R(°), is increasing in °. Hence, rmax
can be found by setting °(rmax; y1) = 0 when y1 is at its largest incentive compatible
level, provided that rmax calculated this way is less than R(0) = ¼1=L (see Lemma 2).
Now, from (30), when ° = 0, the largest incentive compatible y1 is 1=(1 + r). Using
this in (32) con¯rms that rmax = ¼1=I, since L · I.
Part (3): This follows immediately from the last statement in Lemma 2. 2
Proof of Theorem 2
Part 1 : This follows immediately by the discussion in the text and Lemma 3.
Part 2 : The case that r · Á follows from the discussion in the text. So suppose r > Á.
In this case, Lemma 3 tells us that a grace period is necessary. Thus, set d0 = ¼1 and
d1 = (I ¡ ¼1)r. (26) then implies that there is y2 for which it is incentive compatible
to service this debt when an outside manager is in place if and only if r · Á¤, where
Á¤ is implicitly de¯ned by
Á¤(1 + Á¤)2 =
¼2
I ¡ ¼1 :
By the observation immediately after equation (27), the entrepreneur's incentive com-
patibility constraint for servicing debt prior to the appointment of the outside manager
will also be satis¯ed since d0 < d1.
To conclude the proof of Part 2 we need to verify that Á < Á¤ < r¤m. By de¯nition,
r¤m is such that q(r
¤
m) = g(r
¤
m), where q(r) ´ 1=(1+r) and g(r) ´ Ir=¼2. By de¯nition,
Á¤ is such that q(Á¤) = h(Á¤), where h(r) ´ (I ¡ ¼1)r(1 + r)=¼2.
First, g(r) is strictly increasing and linear and h(r) is strictly increasing and strictly
convex. Furthermore, g(0) = h(0) = 0 and g(Á) = h(Á). This implies that for all r > Á,
we have h(r) > g(r).
Second, q(r) is strictly decreasing and q(Á) > g(Á) = h(Á) (since Á < r¤m). It follows
that the point of intersection between h(r) and q(r), at r = Á¤, is larger than Á. It
also follows that Á¤ is smaller than the r at which g(r) intersects q(r). In other words,
Á¤ < r¤m.
Part 3: Follows directly from the discussion in the text. 2
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Legend for Figure 1
a Outside manager's incentive compatibility constraint
y2 · 1
1 + r
b Investors' incentive compatibility constraint (do not liquidate outside manager)
y2 ¸ Ir
(1 + r)¼2
c Financing provided in a managerial equilibrium
y2 ¸ Ir
¼2
d Feasibility of entrepreneur matching dividends of outside manager
y2 · ¼1
¼2
e Entrepreneur prefers to match dividends if ° = °e
y2 · ¼1
¼2
¡ Ir
2
(1 + r)¼2
f Entrepreneur prefers not to match dividends if ° = °m
y2 ¸ ¼1
¼2
¡ Ir
2
¼2
g Financing provided in entrepreneurial equilibrium (assuming ¯rm can be kept alive
by outside manager)
y2 · Ir
(1 + r)¼2
This uses y1¼1 = y2¼2 and is functionally equivalent to constraint b.
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Legend for Figure 2
a Outside manager's incentive compatibility constraint
y2 · 1
1 + r
b Financing in a managerial equilibrium without a grace period
y2 ¸ Ir
¼2
c Feasibility of entrepreneur matching dividends of outside manager
y2 · ¼1
¼2
d Financing provided in a managerial equilibrium with a grace period (and d0 = ¼1)
y2 ¸ (I ¡ ¼1)r(1 + r)
¼2
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